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Abstract 
This paper empirically explores the impact of public debt on economic growth in Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries over the period 1960 to 2015 by using a system Generalized Methods of Moments (s-GMM). 
Specifically, this work studies the nonlinear relationship between public debt and economic growth. To do so, 
we perform the Sasabuchi-Lind-Mehlum’s test (or U-test) to check if the required and sufficient conditions are 
met for an inverted U-shape. The results strongly suggest the presence of a nonlinear relationship between 
public debt and economic growth. By applying the Delta method, this threshold is evaluated at about 36.18 
percent ratio debt-to-GDP with its confidence interval associated (13, 59). The public debt boosts the economic 
growth when its level is less than this turning point. Above this threshold, an increase in public debt would 
lower the economic growth. Accordingly, a re-examination of the public debt level of some convergence 
policies which set this level (debt-to-GDP ratio) to 70 per cent (cf. Boxes 1 and 2) is proposed.  
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1. Introduction 
What about if African countries are preparing to undergo a similar crisis to that of the Greece in 2009? All 
the factors seem to be met to replicate this crisis. Some African countries have benefited from Heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative have had their debt reduced. Thus, they can borrow again from the 
financial market and the good notations they receive from the credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard &Poor’s), the same ones that had minimized the risks of Greek debt, allow them to borrow unwisely 
from the international financial market. From 2009 to 2014, the amount of Eurobonds issued on the 
international market was multiplied by more than 30 for SSA (Sub-Saharan African) countries (cf. Figure 11). 
Nevertheless, the current economic state raises many concerns about this type of practice. Indeed, one might 
question the capacity of these countries to repay these loans insofar as the price of the commodities is 
decreasing. 
Stiglitz and Rashid (2013, June 26), rightly warn the governments of SSA countries about the negative 
effects this debt could have on their economies but nothing seems to stop African governments’ appetite for 
this new financial tool. Furthermore, the interest rates on these bonds seem high. African countries borrow at 
rates of about 6 - 7% even more (Ghana, 8.5% and 10.75% in 2007 and 2015 respectively). These rates are 
similar to European countries like Greece in the midst of economic turmoil.  
What is the level of debt that can be borne by the economies of SSA countries? Should we rely on some 
convergence criteria? Which set the level of public debt (debt-to-GDP ratio) to 70 per cent (cf. Boxes 1 and 2). 
In the present work, we’re trying to answer these questions. Due to the availability of data which are 
downloaded from the World Bank database (2017) and the PWT (Penn World Table ) 9 (Feenstra et al., 2015), 
this work is based on only a panel of 44 out of 49 SSA countries over the period 1960 to 2015.  
One applies the Sasabuchi-Lind-Mehlum’s test developed by Lind and Mehlum (2010) to check for U-
shape between public debt and economic growth as “the usual test of nonlinear relationships is flawed and 
derive the appropriate test for a U-shaped relationship” (p. 1) [18]. As for the value of this turning point and 
its confidence interval associated, both are determined by the Delta method. 
The results suggest the presence of an inverted U-shaped curve between public debt and economic growth 
and the turning point is estimated at around 36.18 percent ratio debt-to-GDP with a confidence interval 
associated of (13, 59). Above this threshold, an increase in public debt could reduce the economic growth. This 
nonlinearity is thoroughly confirmed by the different robustness tests performed (functional form, subsample 
stability, and model stability).  
The rest of this work is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical literature 
review related to (only) the nonlinear relationship between public debt and economic growth; Section 3 is 
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devoted to the econometric approach and gives the different results of the estimations; Section 4 checks for 
the robustness of the findings, and then Section 5 gives the conclusion.  
2. Literature review 
For the Keynesians, in the short run, the market is not always able to achieve the full employment by itself, 
it is for the government to intervene to overcome market failures, reduce economic fluctuations and promote 
balanced growth. Debt is neither a burden for current generations nor for future generations, as it creates an 
increase in investment through the Keynesian multiplier, promoting economic recovery. Conversely, for the 
Classics, the loan is to be avoided because it allows the government to spend more than what is necessary for 
it to achieve its function (Novaresi, 2001). Hayek (1966) denounces the debt as being an artificial growth, based 
on an investment upper to the effort of savings of the nation. As for Meade (1958), he underlines the threshold 
above which the high level of debt could negatively affect the economic growth “a large deadweight debt is a 
burden; it does not follow that the optimum size for the deadweight is zero” (p.79) [19]. 
Accordingly, one can assert that the possible effect of public debt on economic growth can be either (i) 
positive, (ii) negative or (iii) both positive and negative (nonlinear relationship). Since this paper explores the 
nonlinear relationship between debt and economic growth, the empirical literature is based only on this matter 
(Cf. Table 1, for a summary)  
Some recent papers investigate this particular relationship among public debt and economic growth. For 
instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) have considered a panel of 44 countries (emerging and advanced 
economies) over two hundred years and found that the public debt lowers economic growth when its value is 
above 90 percent ratio debt-to-GDP. Besides, they showed that when the external debt is above 60 percent 
ratio debt-to-GDP, the annual economic growth could drop by more than 1 percent point. 
As for Minea and Parent (2012), they questioned the relevance of the statistical method used by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010). Indeed, in the first part of their work they prove the limit of this methodology (statistical 
analysis). By applying a PSTR model, developed by Caner and Hansen (2004), to the same sample as Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010), they found that the turning point is no longer 90 percent ratio debt-to-GDP but above: 115 
percent ratio debt-to-GDP. 
Another important paper is that of Kumar and Woo (2010) which has studied 38 advanced and emerging 
economies for the period 1970–2007 by using two different econometric techniques: between estimator and s-
GMM. Kumar and Woo (Op. cit.) found a strong evidence of the existence of a nonlinear relationship between 
public debt and economic growth and they estimate this threshold at about 90 percent ratio debt-to-GDP: the 
same value Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) found. Above this threshold, an increase of 1% in the debt level would 
slowdown the economic growth by about 0.02%. 
Others studies also point out the nonlinearity between debt and economic growth and evaluate the turning 
point at about 90 percent ratio debt-to-GDP: Checherita and Rother (2010), Pier et al. (2012), Presbitero (2012). 
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Pattillo et al. (2002) examined a panel of 93 developing countries over the period 1969-1998 by computing 
a three-year average panel data. They add to their growth model a quadratic debt term. The s-GMM and FE 
estimate applied to their data yield a threshold at about 35-40 percent ratio debt-to-GDP.  
Misztal (2010) has analyzed this inverted U-shaped curve between public debt and economic growth for 
27 EU (European Union) countries for the period 2000-2010 through a VAR model. This technique estimated 
the turning point at about 65 percent ratio debt-to-GDP. 
By using a PSTR, Grennes et al. (2010), Baum et al. (2012), Chang and Chiang (2012) and Egert (2014) 
pointed out the inverted U-shaped curve between public debt and economic growth.  
Vranceanu and Besencenot (2013) also highlighted this nonlinear relationship between debt and economic 
growth in 26 EU countries over the period 1996 to 2011. By performing a panel FE, they estimate this threshold 
at 150 percent ratio debt-to-GDP. 
Schclarek (2004) studied a panel of 59 developing countries and 24 industrial countries from 1970 to 2002 
and found no evidence of a nonlinear relationship between public debt and economic growth as well. 
Nevertheless, he underpinned a negative relationship between debt and economic growth.  
3. Empirical analysis, data, and results 
This paper aims to explore the relationship between public debt and per-capita GDP growth in the SSA 
countries and, due to the availability of data it is based on 44 countries over the period 1960-2015 (cf. Table 2, 
for the list of countries included in this study). For the regressions, a five-year average data is preferred in order 
to cancel out the effect of short-term volatility which may appear huge in the said periods (Islam, 1995). The 
data is from the World Bank database (2017) and the Penn World Table (PWT 9) (Feenstra et al., 2015). The 
model is based on the convergence growth model by Solow (1956) and Baumol (1986). To take into account 
the goal of this paper, the public debt and its square term are added into this model.  
The set of control variables (cf. Table 3, for the list and definition of variables) have been chosen according 
to the empirical studies about economic growth. Especially this choice is based on Sala-I-Martin et al. (2004)’s 
study: (i) Initial GDP per-capita (In. GDP per-capita) to capture the convergence process. The expected sign 
is negative; (ii) Investment (Inv) to highlight the importance of physical capital accumulation in the production 
process. Its coefficient is expected positive; (iii) Population growth (Pop-gr) to capture the country size. Its sign 
is expected negative because the 𝑦 (dependent) variable is GDP per-capita growth rate. If other conditions are 
constant, rapid population growth will make the portion of one person smaller; (iv) Inflation (Inf) to apprehend 
the variation of the general level of prices on growth. Its coefficient is expected negative; (v) Trade openness 
(Open) to show the importance of the process of technology spillovers on economic growth. Its coefficient is 
expected positive; (vi) Primary completion rate (Pcr) is used to proxy the human capital. Its coefficient is 
expected positive; (vii) Government size (Gov_size) to show the impact of government expenditure on 
economic growth. The sign of its coefficient is undetermined. 
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The baseline equation is, 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2. (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖,𝑡))
2 +  𝛾. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1)  
Where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡   is GDP per-capita growth rates, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is public debt and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a set of control variables which contains 
initial GDP per-capita, investment, population growth rates, inflation, openness, primary completion rate and 
government size. 𝜇𝑖 is the country specific effect, 𝜈𝑡 is the time fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 the error term. 
Due to (i) the possible inverse relationship between the variable of interest (public debt) and the dependent 
variable (GDP per-capita growth rates) and (ii) the apparent endogeneity of some control variables, the static 
panel techniques (OLS, FE, and RE) are inconsistent. Likewise, the presence of heteroskedasticity (cf. Table 4) 
makes the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator more efficient than the usual Instrumental 
Variables Estimator (IVE) (Baum et al., 2003). Therefore, to address these issues ((i) and (ii)), the GMM 
estimator is employed with a preference for the Blundell-Bond (1998) System GMM (s-GMM) since the pitfall 
of the difference GMM (d-GMM) is that sometimes the lagged-level used as instruments are weak[6]. So, 
according to this former method, Eq.(1) can be expressed as follows 
 
(
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡
) = 𝛽1 (
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐷𝑖,𝑡)
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐷𝑖,𝑡)
) + 𝛽2 (
(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖,𝑡))
2
∆(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖,𝑡))2
) + 𝛾 (
𝑋𝑖,𝑡
∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡
) + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2)  
Doing so, Blundell-Bond (Op. cit.) suggest choosing,  
(i) the lagged first difference of the endogenous variables and the exogenous variables as 
instruments for the equation in levels; 
(ii) the first difference of the exogenous variables and the lagged level of the endogenous variables 
as instruments for the equation in first difference. 
In this paper, the following variables are considered endogenous and treated according to Blundell-Bond 
(1998)’s recommendations: Initial GDP per-capita, public debt, and its square term, investment and trade 
openness.  
One of the disadvantages of the GMM technique is that it sometimes generates too many instruments 
which could cause a weak instrument bias (Roodman, 2009). To deal with this issue Roodman (2009) advises 
“collapsing the instrument matrix” and/or limiting “the number of lagged levels in the instrument matrix” 
[30]. The s-GMM estimation in this work combines the two propositions for more efficiency. As the 
Windmeijer (2005)’s correction is applied to the s-GMM, one relies on the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions instead of Sargan test since this latter is inconsistent under robust GMM (Roodman, 2006).  
For a good estimate with s-GMM if the lagged dependent variable is persistent (coefficient lagged 
dependent variable → 1), it should lie between FE and OLS estimate (Roodman, 2006) as, both probably biased 
downwards for the former and upwards for the latter. In the growth model, the coefficient of lagged dependent 
variable (convergence rate) is characterized by the coefficient of initial GDP per-capita. 
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To check the U-shape, one usually relies on the coefficient 𝛽2 (coefficient of power term). A negative sign 
of this latter is interpreted as the clue of a turning point between public debt and economic growth. However, 
Lind and Mehlum (2010) claim that this technique is inconsistent and inappropriate since “the problem arises 
when the true relationship is convex but monotone over relevant data values. A quadratic specification may 
then erroneously yield an extreme point and hence a U shape” (p. 110) [18]. Contrariwise, the U-test checks if 
the required and sufficient conditions are met for an inverted U-shape. The null and alternative hypotheses of 
this test are H0: Monotone or U shape and H1: Inverse U-shape respectively. This technique is applied to this 
paper. 
To estimate the debt threshold, beyond which public debt hurts the economic growth, we differentiate 
Eq.(1) with respect to 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and set it to 0, 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
=
𝛽1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+
2𝛽2ln (𝐷𝑖,𝑡)
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
= 0 ⟹ (𝐷𝑖,𝑡)𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
𝛽1
2𝛽2
) 
The value of this turning point and the confidence interval associated are both determined by the Delta method. 
Based on the Taylor approximation, this technique computes the variance of a nonlinear function of random 
variables (the ratio, in this work) by linearization (Rao (1973)). 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The mean of public debt is estimated at about 65.59 percent ratio debt-to-GDP over the period 1960 to 
2015 (cf. Table 5). This value is in line with the convergence criteria which set the level of public debt (debt-
to-GDP ratio) to 70 per cent (cf. Boxes 1 and 2). The maximum and the minimum debt value are 318.66 and 
3.85 percent respectively. For the same period, the mean of GDP per-capita growth rate is evaluated at 2.285 
percent. Besides, the population growth rate in SSA countries is relatively high. Over the period of study, its 
mean and maximum values are estimated at 2.508 % and 6.101% respectively. This may be one of the reasons 
why SSA countries which have the highest growth rate in the world, paradoxically, fails to reduce the poverty 
rate: Its population grows faster than its economic growth. 
The correlation matrix (Table 6) suggest (i) investment, trade openness and primary completion rate boost 
the economic growth while the inflation lowers this latter, (ii) the positive impact of public debt on economic 
growth would be a sign of a U-shaped between these two variables (iii) in the case of SSA countries, the high 
population rate could be explained by its level of public debt. The correlation between these variables are 
positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level and (iv) the public debt reduces the GDP per-capita and 
the primary completion rate. 
3.2 Impact of debt on GDP per-capita growth 
The results of the estimation of Eq.(2) by s-GMM are given in Table 7 (column (3) and (6)). All the variables 
have the expected signs such as defined at the beginning of Section 3. Government size which the sign of its 
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coefficient was undetermined appears negative (-1.591) and statistically significant at 5 percent level. This could 
reflect the negative impact of government spending on economic growth. 
The null hypothesis of Arellano-Bond (1991) test for no second order serial correlation in the linear 
regression (p-value=0.304) and the nonlinear regression (p-value=0.400) are not rejected. Furthermore, the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for these two regressions yields a p-value of 0.217 for the former 
and 0.310 for the latter. These values suggest a validity of instruments. 
Linear relationship (column (3)). Since the results strongly suggest a nonlinear relationship between 
public debt and GDP per-capita growth rate (column (6)), this estimation (column (3)) is not efficient. This 
inefficiency is (also) underpinned by the coefficient of lagged dependent variable (-2.378) which is not included 
in the interval (-1.340, -1.133) as Roodman (2006) advised. For these reasons, the results are not interpreted. 
Nonlinear relationship (column (6)). The lagged dependent variable got by s-GMM is still persistent (-
1.102) but this time, it is comprised between the coefficients found by FE (-1.127) and POLS (-0.901). This 
range insinuates that our estimate is probably consistent. For this regression, the coefficient of power term is 
negative (𝛽2 = −1.165) and statistically significant at 5 percent level. This result bolsters the presence of a 
nonlinear relationship between public debt and economic growth. As mentioned above, the coefficient of 
power term alone doesn’t guarantee the presence of an inverse U-shape between two variables. One needs an 
appropriate test: Sasabuchi-Lind-Mehlum’s test. The null hypothesis of this test (H0: Monotone or U shape) is 
rejected at 5 percent level (cf. Table 8). This result suggests the presence of a threshold above which public 
debt would hurt the economic growth. The Delta method evaluates this turning point at about 36.18 percent 
ratio debt-to-GDP with a confidence interval equal to (13, 59). Above this limit, an increase in public debt 
could negatively affect the economic growth. This finding accentuates the importance to reexamine the 
convergence criteria for some communities (cf. Boxes 1 and 2 in Appendix A) and/or to limit the level of 
public debt at a ceiling less than 36.18 percent ratio debt to GDP.  
Likewise, these results are roughly the same with those found by Pattillo et al. (2002) in their study. Indeed, 
this latter based on a sample containing only developing countries (93) estimates the turning point at around 
35-40 percent ratio debt-to-GDP.  
As for the explanatory variables, the Initial GDP per-capita is negative and statistically significant at 10 
percent level. This result sheds light on the conditional convergence such as defined by Barro (1991). According 
to him, the poor countries (low Initial GDP per-capita) have high per-capita growth rate to catch up the rich 
countries, all other things being equal. As for the investment, it positively affects the per-capita GDP growth 
rate. Its coefficient (0.241) is statistically significant at 1 percent level.  
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4. Robustness tests 
As Kumar and Woo (2010), Checherita and Rother (2010) and other important researchers, this paper also 
examines for the robustness of these findings through three tests: functional form, subsample stability and 
model stability. All the tests are performed by using a s-GMM. 
The consistency of the polynomial functional form. According to Checherita and Rother (2010), if the 
form of Eq.(2) is well specified, the concavity shape should remain unchanged even when the power term 
changes. That is, one re-estimate Eq.(2) by s-GMM by varying the power term from 1.2 to 3 (Cf. Table 9). To 
save the place, the results of Arellano-Bond (1991) test for no second order serial correlation and the Hansen 
test of overidentifying restrictions are not presented even if the p-values of those tests fail to reject the null 
hypothesis in each case. By varying the power term, its coefficient remains negative and statistically significant 
at 5 percent (power 1.2-2) and 10 percent (power 2.2-3) level which confirms the presence of an inverted U-
shaped curve between public debt and economic growth. Changing the power term does not affect the 
concavity shape of the relationship between debt and economic growth. 
Subsample stability (Cf. Table 10). The consistency of the turning point is tested through the subsample 
stability by (i) modifying the period of estimation (columns (2)), (ii) removing from the sample (a) the five most 
indebted countries (columns (4)) and (b) the five least indebted countries (columns (6)) and (iii) changing the 
period of estimate and removing from the sample (a) the five most indebted countries (columns (8)) and (b) 
the five least indebted countries (columns (10)). For all the regressions, the coefficient of power term (𝛽2) 
remain negative and statistically significant at 1 percent level (columns (6) and (10)), 5 percent level (columns 
(4) and (8)) and 10 percent level (columns (2)) confirming the presence of the turning point. The value of these 
thresholds associated with each new sample is between 30.79-41.79 percent ratio debt-to-GDP: values roughly 
identical to the value found previously (Section 3): 36.18 percent ratio debt-to-GDP. 
Model stability (Cf. Table 11). To check for the validity of the main equation (Eq.(1)), we control for 
some important variables which are supposed to have a strong relationship with the dependent variable but not 
included into the model: Exchange rate (column(3)) (Habib et al., 2016), Urbanization (column(6)) as a proxy 
for the quality of Institutions (Glaeser et al., 2004; Kumar and Woo, 2010) and Foreign direct investment 
(column(9)). Regardless the new variable introduced into the model, the coefficient of power term (𝛽2) is still 
negative and statistically significant at 5 percent level (column(6)) and 10 percent level (column(3) and (9)), 
reflecting the presence of a turning point in each case. The different thresholds associated to 𝛽2 (32.91 
(column(3)); 39.63 (column(6)) and 34.07 (column(9)) percent ratio debt-to-GDP) are quite similar to that got 
in Section 3 (36.18 percent ratio debt-to-GDP) and suggest that Eq.(1) is well specified. 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
This paper mainly investigates the impact of public debt on economic growth. The results suggest the 
presence of a threshold above which the debt would hurt the economic growth. This turning point is estimated 
at about 36.18 percent ratio debt-to-GDP with a confidence interval associated of (13, 59).  
Irrevocably these results highlight the need to reduce the level of public debt in order to stimulate the 
economies. In particular, we (highly) recommend a re-examination of the public debt level for the convergence 
policies which set this level to 70 per cent ratio debt-to-GDP. This value is about twice the value of the 
threshold that these economies can bear without triggering the negative impact of the public debt. To make the 
debt reduction policy more effective, it should be accompanied by an improvement in the political and 
economic environment. Indeed, the negative impact of GDP per-capita on credits to the private sectors shows 
that capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa is due to political instability (insecurity, embezzlement). 
Lastly, in Africa 14 countries (CEMAC2 and WAEMU3 countries) have they currency which is pegged to 
Euro, it could be noteworthy to investigate how this link between these currencies affect the relation between 
debt and economic growth: does the currency pegged matter for the value of turning point?  
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Figure 1: Bond issuances in SSA 2009-2014 (without South Africa) (US$ Millions) 
 
 
Source: ODI, 2015 and Author’s calculation 
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Box 2: WAEMU convergence criteria 
First-order criteria 
Overall Balance/GDP (≥ −3 percent) 
Average consumer price inflation (≤ 3 percent) 
Total debt1/GDP (≤70 percent) 
Second-order criteria 
Wages and salaries/tax revenue (≤35 percent) 
Tax revenue/GDP (≥20 percent) 
Source: WAEMU 
1Public debt 
 
 
 
Box 1: CEMAC convergence criteria 
Basic fiscal balance1 (≥ 0) 
Consumer price inflation (≤ 3%)  
Level of public debt (≤ 70%) 
Non-accumulation of government arrears2 (≤0) 
Source: CEMAC 
1Overall budget balance, excluding grants and foreign-financed investment. 
2External and domestic arrears. 
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Table 1: Summary literature 
Author(s) 
Type of Data, Countries and 
Time Period 
Empirical Approach 
Threshold 
(%GDP) 
Journal 
Pattillo et al. 
(2002) 
Panel data, 93 developing 
countries, 1969-1998 
Fixed Effect (FE) and 
system Generalized 
Method of Moments (s-
GMM) 
35-40% Working Paper, IMF. 
Schclarek, A. 
(2004) 
Panel data, 59 developing 
countries and 24 industrial 
countries 
Method of Moments (s-
GMM) 
No evidence of 
presence of 
nonlinearity 
Working Paper, Department 
of Economics, Lund 
University, Sweden. 
Checherita, C., 
Rother, P. 
(2010) 
Panel data, 12 EU countries 
over the period 1970-2010 
Fixed Effect (FE) models 
and Instrumental 
Variables (IVREG) 
models 
90-100% European Economic Review 
Kumar and 
Woo (2010) 
Panel data, 38 advanced and 
emerging economies for the 
period 1970–2007 
between estimator (BE), 
Generalized Method of 
Moments (s-GMM) 
90% Working Paper, IMF. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) 
Panel data, 44 countries 
(emerging and advanced 
economies) over two 
hundred years 
Statistical analysis About 90% American Economic Review 
Grennes et al. 
(2010) 
Panel data, 101 countries 
(developing and advanced 
economies), 1980-2008 
Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression (PSTR) Model 
77% (full sample) 
64% (developing 
countries) 
Econometric Theory, 
Cambridge University Press 
Misztal (2010) 
Panel data, 27 EU countries, 
2000-2010 
Vector Auto-Regression 
model (VAR) 
65% 
Journal of Applied Economic 
Sciences 
Baum et al. 
(2012) 
Panel data, 12 EU countries, 
1990-2010 
Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression (PSTR) Model 
95% American Economic Review 
Minea and 
Parent (2012) 
Re-evaluate the work of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression (PSTR) Model 
115% 
Working Paper, Center for 
Studies and Research on 
International Development 
Egert (2014) 
Panel data, 21 developed 
and 28 emerging economies, 
1960-2010 
Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression (PSTR) Model 
20-60% Working Paper, OECD 
Chang and 
Chiang (2012) 
Panel data, 19 OECD 
countries, 1993-2007 
Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression (PSTR) Model 
97.82% 
Journal for Economic 
Forecasting 
Pier et al. (2012) 
34 OECD countries, 1960-
2011 
System Generalized 
Method of Moments (s-
GMM) 
90% OECD Journal 
Presbitero 
(2012) 
Panel data, low and middle-
income countries, 1990-
2007 
System Generalized 
Method of Moments (s-
GMM) 
90% 
European Journal of 
Development Research 
Vranceanu and 
Besencenot 
(2013) 
Panel data, 26 EU countries, 
1996-2011 
Panel FE 150% Applied Economics Letters 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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Table 2: List of Sub-Saharan African Countries by Region 
 
1.Central Africa region South Sudan1 4.West Africa region 
Burundi  Sudan  Benin 
Cameroon  Tanzania Burkina Faso 
Central African Republic Uganda Cote d’Ivoire 
Chad 3.South Africa region Ghana 
Congo, Dem Angola  Niger 
Rep. Congo Botswana Nigeria 
Equatorial Guinea Lesotho  Togo 
Gabon Madagascar Cabo Verde 
Rwanda Malawi1 Gambia 
2.East Africa region Mauritius  Guinea 
Comoros  Mozambique  Guinea-Bissau 
Djibouti  Namibia Liberia 
Kenya South Africa Mali 
Eritrea1 Swaziland  Mauritania 
Ethiopia Zambia  Sao Tome And Principe1 
Seychelles Zimbabwe Senegal 
Somalia1 SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE1 Sierra Leone 
1 These countries are not included in this study.  
 
 
Table 3: Variables and definition 
 
Variables Source Definition 
GDP growth       WDI Gross Domestic Product growth 
In. GDP per-capita  WDI 
Initial GDP per capita (constant, US$) = GDP per capita (constant, US$) at the beginning of 
each five-year period  
PCR              WDI Primary completion rate as Proxy of Human capital 
Inf              WDI Inflation rate 
Gov-size         WDI Government-size (%GDP) 
Open             WDI Openness(%GDP) = Export(%GDP) + Import(%GDP)  
Inv              WDI Investment (%GDP) 
Pop-growth       WDI Population growth   
Debt        WDI Public debt (%GDP) 
Exc-rate         WDI Exchange rate (LCU per US$) 
Cred-ps WDI Credits to private sector (%GDP) 
FDI WDI Foreign direct investment (%GDP) 
Bm WDI Broad money (%GDP) 
Irs WDI Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate, %) 
TFP PWT 9 Total Factor Productivity  
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Table 4: White’s test for heteroscedasticity 
𝐶ℎ𝑖(𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒) 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑃 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
117.94 94 0.0480 
Note. The null hypothesis of this test is homoscedasticity. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, WDI 2015), and Author’s calculation 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics  
N=144 observations (Variables present in Eq.(1)) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP per-capita growth 2.285 1.600 5.580 -11.778 51.623 
GDP per-capita (constant 
2000 US$) 
2406.969 834.798 3752.088 211.102 23211.5 
Investment (%GDP) 22.963 20.497 17.313 5.231 173.374 
Population growth   2.508 2.667 1.004 -4.105 6.101 
Inflation rate 11.434 5.191 32.844 0.918 303.782 
Trade Openness 81.903 69.893 51.893 23.877 436.572 
Primary completion rate 60.020 59.665 22.458 15.183 108.625 
Government-size (%GDP) 14.956 14.327 6.114 2.804 41.330 
Public debt (%GDP) 65.590 55.901 48.778 3.848 318.662 
 
Source: WDI 2015, and Author’s calculation 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix, 1960-2015 
 gdpgr_pc gdpc Inv pop_gr inf open pcr gov_size debt 
gdpgr_pc 1         
gdpc 0.0463 1        
Inv 0.5514*** 0.2584*** 1       
pop_gr 0.0654 -0.1870*** 0.0393 1      
inf -0.1452*** -0.0311 -0.0761 -0.0089 1     
open 0.3712*** 0.3327*** 0.7192*** -0.0259 -0.0020 1    
pcr 0.1650*** 0.4064*** 0.2034*** -0.2492*** -0.0193 0.3092*** 1   
gov_size -0.0304 0.1089** 0.1891*** -0.0853* -0.0218 0.3701*** 0.1326** 1  
debt 0.0520 -0.1659** -0.0192 0.1881*** -0.0043 0.0734 -0.1964*** 0.0055 1 
Note. */**/***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Source: WDI 2015, and Author’s calculation 
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Table 7: Impact of public debt on economic growth, 1960-2015 (Five-year average panel data)  
(Dependent variable: GDP per-capita growth) 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
Linear relationship Nonlinear relationship 
 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
POLS 
(3) 
S-GMM 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
POLS 
(6) 
S-GMM 
In. GDP per-capita 
(log) 
-1.340 
(1.978) 
-1.133* 
(0.576) 
-2.378*** 
(0.694) 
-1.127 
(1.827) 
-0.901 
(0.562) 
-1.102* 
(0.636) 
Inv  
0.306*** 
(0.076) 
0.243*** 
(0.039) 
0.258*** 
(0.049) 
0.287*** 
(0.075) 
0.227*** 
(0.037) 
0.241*** 
(0.027) 
Pop-growth (log) 
0.276 
(1.024) 
-0.559 
(0.860) 
-1.617* 
(0.876) 
0.402 
(1.045) 
-0.193 
(0.873) 
-0.303 
(0.817) 
Inf (log) 
-2.520*** 
(0.561) 
-0.427 
(0.545) 
-1.112** 
(0.482) 
-2.481*** 
(0.550) 
-0.267 
(0.576) 
-0.561 
(0.516) 
Open 
0.034 
(0.020) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.018 
(0.026) 
0.037* 
(0.021) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
Pcr (log) 
-4.140** 
(1.956) 
0.698 
(1.162) 
1.416 
(1.323) 
-4.081** 
(1.932) 
0.452 
(1.131) 
0.991 
(1.131) 
Gov-size (log) 
-4.762** 
(2.187) 
-0.611 
(0.908) 
-1.365* 
(0.775) 
-4.710** 
(2.268) 
-0.764 
(0.843) 
-1.591** 
(0.683) 
Log(Debt) 
-1.236 
(0.760) 
-0.775* 
(0.402) 
-0.821 
(0.628) 
3.127 
(2.097) 
6.848** 
(3.037) 
8.364* 
(4.418) 
(Log(Debt))2 - - - 
-0.561** 
(0.253) 
-1.007** 
(0.401) 
-1.165** 
(0.585) 
Constant 
43.587*** 
(15.754) 
7.670 
(5.446) 
17.245 
(8.496) 
33.636** 
(16.157) 
-7.162 
(8.466) 
-9.361 
(10.638) 
AR(2) p-value1   0.304   0.400 
Hansen p-value2   0.217   0.310 
Nb. obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 
R-squared 0.788 0.682  0.791 0.698  
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Delta method)       
Turning-point NA NA NA 16.22 30.01*** 36.18*** 
95% CI nlcom NA NA NA (-12, 44) (15, 45) (13, 59) 
Note. */**/***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; () = standard error; 
1H0: no autocorrelation of order 2; 2H0: no correlation between instruments and the residuals. 
 
Source: WDI 2015, and Author’s calculation 
 
 
      Table 8: Sasabuchi-Lind-Mehlum’s test  
Extreme point: (Log(Debt))max= 3.588623 
Test: 
H1: Inverse U-shape 
vs. H0: Monotone or U-shape 
 Lower bound Upper bound 
Interval 1.347553 4.300000 
Slope 5.223036 -1.657935 
t-value 1.817412 -1.678673 
P>t 0.035624 0.047700 
 
Overall test of presence of an Inverse U-shape: 
     t-value =      1.68 
     P>|t| =     0.0477 
 
   Source: WDI 2015, and Author’s calculation 
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Table 9: Robustness checks –The consistency of the polynomial functional form 
 
 
Powers 
Coefficient 
power term 
Turning 
point  
95% CI 
1.2 -26.1986** 33.78*** (13, 54) 
1.4 -8.8456** 34.51*** (13, 56) 
1.6 -4.0384** 35.15*** (13, 57) 
1.8 -2.0938** 35.71*** (13, 58) 
2 -1.1653** 36.18*** (13, 59) 
2.2 -0.6785* 36.58*** (13, 60) 
2.4 -0.4076* 36.90*** (12, 61) 
2.6 -0.2506* 37.15*** (12, 63) 
2.8 -0.1567* 37.32*** (11, 64) 
3 -0.0994* 37.42*** (10, 65) 
 
Note. */**/***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Source: WDI 2015, and Author’s calculation 
 
Table 10: Robustness checks -Subsample stability 
(Dependent variable: GDP per-capita growth) 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
Period: 1996-2015 
Sample: Full sample 
Period: 1960-2015 
Sample:(-)the 5-HIC (SGMM-h) and the (-) the 
5-LIC(SGMM-l) 
Period: 1996-2015 
Sample:(-)the 5-HIC (SGMM-h) and the 5-
LIC(SGMM-l) 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
SGMM 
(3) 
FE-h 
(4) 
SGMM-h 
(5) 
FE-l 
(6) 
SGMM-l 
(7) 
FE-h 
(8) 
SGMM-h 
(9) 
FE-l 
(10) 
SGMM-l 
In. GDP per-capita 
(log) 
-8.188*** 
(1.582) 
-0.768 
(0.846) 
-0.792 
(1.853) 
-1.239** 
(0.505) 
-1.341 
(1.775) 
-1.038 
(0.683) 
-7.786*** 
(1.674) 
-0.954 
(0.672) 
-8.136*** 
(1.911) 
-0.984 
(0.757) 
Inv  
0.240*** 
(0.053) 
0.259*** 
(0.038) 
0.300*** 
(0.076) 
0.218*** 
(0.024) 
0.280*** 
(0.068) 
0.226*** 
(0.035) 
0.249*** 
(0.055) 
0.230*** 
(0.033) 
0.231*** 
(0.055) 
0.239*** 
(0.027) 
Pop-growth (log) 
-0.446 
(1.040) 
0.038 
(0.853) 
0.404 
(1.021) 
-0.579 
(0.717) 
0.142 
(1.240) 
-0.335 
(1.086) 
-0.424 
(1.027) 
-0.073 
(0.919) 
-0.400 
(1.304) 
-0.214 
(0.899) 
Inf (log) 
-1.445*** 
(0.492) 
-0.491 
(0.622) 
-2.508*** 
(0.542) 
-0.777 
(0.494) 
-2.458*** 
(0.523) 
-0.101 
(0.676) 
-1.469*** 
(0.500) 
-0.767 
(0.489) 
-1.444** 
(0.537) 
-0.211 
(0.637) 
Open 
0.005 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
0.050** 
(0.022) 
0.039*** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
Pcr (log) 
-2.149 
(1.557) 
0.379 
(1.375) 
-4.387** 
(1.998) 
0.342 
(1.149) 
-4.408** 
(2.021) 
0.633 
(1.467) 
-2.239 
(1.632) 
-0.219 
(1.351) 
-2.002 
(1.762) 
0.090 
(1.338) 
Gov-size (log) 
-2.658 
(2.337) 
-1.291 
(0.876) 
-3.972* 
(2.267) 
-1.312** 
(0.634) 
-5.360** 
(2.428) 
-1.130 
(1.138) 
-2.188 
(2.419) 
-1.042 
(0.929) 
-3.299 
(2.633) 
-1.123 
(0.956) 
Log(Debt) 
1.178 
(1.466) 
9.028* 
(4.689) 
1.655 
(1.912) 
8.248** 
(4.117) 
2.227 
(2.291) 
9.244*** 
(2.941) 
0.613 
(1.684) 
9.673** 
(4.454) 
0.613 
(1.551) 
9.198*** 
(3.210) 
(Log(Debt))2 
-0.199 
(0.164) 
-1.209* 
(0.635) 
-0.378 
(0.236) 
-1.203** 
(0.577) 
-0.520* 
(0.264) 
-1.344*** 
(0.398) 
-0.122 
(0.196) 
-1.365** 
(0.628) 
-0.196 
(0.169) 
-1.294*** 
(0.445) 
Constant 
69.628*** 
(13.029) 
-12.908 
(11.657) 
32.90** 
(16.00) 
-5.280 
(10.285) 
41.120** 
(18.956) 
-11.267 
(10.860) 
66.382*** 
(12.909) 
-9.165 
(11.513) 
72.357*** 
(15.544) 
-9.990 
(10.548) 
AR(2) p-value1  0.287  0.315  0.467  0.232  0.283 
Hansen p-value2  0.165  0.365  0.226  0.167  0.457 
Nb. obs. 133 133 134 134 125 125 124 124 116 116 
R-squared 0.854  0.795  0.828  0.856  0.875  
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Delta method)           
Turning-point - 41.79** - 30.79*** 8.52 31.16*** - 34.61*** - 34.95*** 
95% CI nlcom - (8, 75) - (14, 48) (-13, 3) (10, 52) - (13, 56) - (16, 54) 
Note. */**/***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; () = standard error; 
1H0: no autocorrelation of order 2; 2H0: no correlation between instruments and the residuals 
(-) the 5-HIC: sample restriction, without the 5 most indebted countries; 
(-) the 5-LIC: sample restriction, without the 5 least indebted countries. 
 
Source: WDI 2015, and Author’s calculation 
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Table 11: Robustness checks -Model stability 
(Dependent variable: GDP per-capita growth) 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
POLS 
(3) 
SGMM 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
POLS 
(6) 
SGMM 
(7) 
FE 
(8) 
POLS 
(9) 
SGMM 
In. GDP per-capita 
(log) 
-1.169 
(1.906) 
-0.925* 
(0.556) 
-1.055 
(0.677) 
-0.942 
(1.814) 
-0.680 
(0.650) 
-0.843 
(0.660) 
-1.168 
(1.924) 
-0.744 
(0.557) 
-1.081 
(0.707) 
Inv  
0.283*** 
(0.079) 
0.231*** 
(0.037) 
0.246*** 
(0.033) 
0.290*** 
(0.075) 
0.227*** 
(0.037) 
0.239*** 
(0.026) 
0.258*** 
(0.084) 
0.215*** 
(0.039) 
0.232*** 
(0.030) 
Pop-growth (log) 
0.436 
(1.106) 
-0.169 
(0.874) 
-0.104 
(0.858) 
0.226 
(1.102) 
-0.061 
(0.900) 
-0.131 
(0.744) 
0.541 
(1.052) 
-0.219 
(0.880) 
-0.458 
(0.750) 
Inf (log) 
-2.399*** 
(0.748) 
-0.197 
(0.600) 
-0.435 
(0.488) 
-2.590*** 
(0.582) 
-0.314 
(0.571) 
-0.608 
(0.540) 
-2.470*** 
(0.550) 
-0.276 
(0.573) 
-0.589 
(0.504) 
Open 
0.038* 
(0.022) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.036* 
(0.021) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.039* 
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.023 
(0.016) 
Pcr (log) 
-3.995** 
(1.973) 
0.374 
(1.124) 
0.393 
(1.092) 
-4.090** 
(1.880) 
0.642 
(1.131) 
1.146 
(1.137) 
-4.208** 
(1.876) 
0.372 
(1.117) 
0.912 
(0.937) 
Gov-size (log) 
-4.599* 
(2.364) 
-0.948 
(0.839) 
-1.518** 
(0.683) 
-4.901** 
(2.269) 
-0.785 
(0.854) 
-1.490** 
(0.716) 
-4.686** 
(2.229) 
-0.795 
(0.834) 
-1.600** 
(0.662) 
Log(Debt) 
3.301 
(2.159) 
7.068** 
(3.017) 
8.281* 
(4.642) 
3.008 
(2.168) 
7.278** 
(3.097) 
9.112** 
(3.921) 
2.413 
(2.238) 
6.647** 
(3.090) 
7.630 
(4.732) 
(Log(Debt))2 
-0.592** 
(0.265) 
-1.035** 
(0.399) 
-1.185* 
(0.617) 
-0.530** 
(0.262) 
-1.036** 
(0.404) 
-1.238** 
(0.510) 
-0.465 
(0.301) 
-0.987** 
(0.407) 
-1.081* 
(0.628) 
Exc-rates 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
      
Urb     
0.123 
(0.143) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
-0.028 
(0.029) 
   
FDI       
0.071 
(0.109) 
0.071 
(0.053) 
0.035 
(0.088) 
Constant 
28.481 
(17.330) 
-9.159 
(8.668) 
-8.576 
(11.492) 
23.629 
(16.750) 
-12.346 
(9.370) 
-12.929 
(10.657) 
31.114* 
(15.977) 
-9.337 
(8.857) 
-6.979 
(11.773) 
AR(2) p-value1   0.373   0.443   0.430 
Hansen p-value2   0.361   0.616   0.667 
Nb. obs. 142 142 142 143 143 143 143 143 143 
R-squared 0.786 0.705  0.794 0.701  0.794 0.702  
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Delta method)          
Turning-point 16.24 30.44*** 32.91*** 17.10 33.55*** 39.63*** 13.39 29.03*** 34.07*** 
95% CI nlcom (-11, 43) (16, 45) (11, 55) (-14, 48) (17, 50) (17, 62) (-14, 41) (14, 44) (9, 59) 
Note. */**/***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; () = standard error 
1H0: no autocorrelation of order 2; 2H0: no correlation between instruments and the residuals. 
 
                      Source: WDI 2015, and Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
